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Abstract
In the United States, all 50 states and the District of Columbia have enacted 
statutes that allow police officers to make warrantless arrests for domestic 
violence given probable cause; however, state laws differ from one another 
in multiple, important ways. Research on domestic violence warrantless ar-
rest laws rarely describe them as anything more than discretionary, pre-
ferred, or mandatory, either within their analyses or within the texts of their 
publications; researchers, and their audiences, may not be aware of the vast 
and potentially important differences among these laws. In this article, we 
list the domestic violence warrantless arrest laws for each state, and discuss 
them in terms of five common elements: the phrasing of the arrest authority; 
whether additional factors to domestic violence are required to trigger the 
arrest authority; qualifications to the arrest authority; time limits for war-
rantless arrest to occur; and whether police officers are required to report 
why they made a dual or no arrest. We then analyze the common elements 
of the laws, paying particular attention to how they may encourage or dis-
courage the arrest of alleged domestic violence perpetrators. It is critical 
that researchers, advocates, and policymakers are aware of these variations 
Article
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in state statutes when conducting or interpreting research or making policy 
recommendations.
Keywords
domestic violence, legal intervention, batterers, criminology
In the United States in 2005, more than 60% of the more than 564,000 nonfatal, 
violent incidents perpetrated by intimate partners were reported to the police 
(Catalano, 2007). Whether police arrested the alleged perpetrators of domes-
tic violence (DV) in response to these reports varied widely, based in part on 
state law governing the ability or duty of an officer to make a warrantless 
arrest. Although all 50 states and the District of Columbia currently allow 
officers to make warrantless arrests for DV, state laws differ from one 
another in multiple, important ways. This article details, compares, and ana-
lyzes differences between state DV warrantless arrest laws but begins with a 
brief history.
Historically, DV crimes were considered family matters that were best 
handled in the privacy of the home. Prior to the late 1970s, it was not uncom-
mon for law enforcement to ignore calls from DV victims. Police officers who 
responded to DV calls generally attempted to diffuse the immediate situation 
by employing conflict resolution tactics, including mediation and separation 
(Buzawa & Buzawa, 1993; Maxwell, Garner, & Fagan, 2001). Under the com-
mon law, officers were precluded from making warrantless arrests for misde-
meanor crimes of DV, as most DV crimes are classified (Buzawa & Buzawa, 
2003), even if there was probable cause to suggest that the alleged perpetrator 
committed the crime (Harvey, 1994). Warrantless arrests could be made only 
in circumstances where the officer witnessed an act of DV (Miller, 2005).
With the advent of the 1980s came many factors that coalesced to provide 
circumstances ripe for passage of laws authorizing police officers to make 
warrantless arrests when acts of DV were committed outside of their presence 
(Buzawa & Buzawa, 1993; Schmidt & Sherman, 1993). The women’s move-
ment continued to gain in strength and agitated for DV to be treated as a 
crime (Buzawa & Buzawa, 1993). Concurrently, the political landscape was 
less rehabilitative and more punitive toward criminal offenders (Buzawa & 
Buzawa, 1993); for example, the juvenile justice system experienced changes 
that made it easier for juveniles to be charged and tried as adults and imposed 
increased retributive sanctions on such offenders to “provide consequences 
to the lawbreaker” (Bazemore & Umbreit, 1995). Furthermore, the U.S. Attorney 
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General’s Family Violence Task Force recommended arrest as an appropri-
ate response to family violence (Hart, 1984). Arguably, the most prominent 
catalyst for the passage of DV warrantless arrest laws was the Minneapolis 
Domestic Violence Experiment (MDVE), a study that evaluated the effects 
of various law enforcement responses on the recurrence of DV incidents. The 
results of the MDVE suggested that arresting a DV perpetrator decreased the 
likelihood of future violence against the same victim when compared with 
other strategies (Sherman & Berk, 1984). In an effort to create a more puni-
tive, effective, and consistent police response, many states implemented stat-
utes that limited officer discretion in whether to make DV arrests.
The proliferation of state laws allowing warrantless arrests for misde-
meanor DV on a showing of probable cause that the alleged perpetrator com-
mitted a crime raises serious constitutional issues. The concept of probable 
cause is largely a judicial construct and difficult to define precisely. As noted 
by Miller and Wright (2007), “Probable cause is constantly applied but only 
rarely defined.” The most widely accepted definitions of probable cause come 
from the U.S. Supreme Court decisions Brinegar v. United States (1949) and 
Beck v. Ohio (1964). In Brinegar, the Court emphasized a focus on probabilities 
in defining probable cause:
It has come to mean more than bare suspicion: Probable cause exists 
where the facts and circumstances within [the officers’] knowledge 
and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] suffi-
cient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief 
that an offense has been or is being committed. (Brinegar v. United 
States, 1949)
Furthermore, in Beck v. Ohio (1964), the Supreme Court found that in the 
determination of whether probable cause existed, the facts and circumstances 
must suggest that the officer had reasonably trustworthy information that the 
alleged perpetrator committed an offense. This information can come from 
varied sources such as victims, witnesses, informants, and police officers 
themselves (Miller & Wright, 2007).
The U.S. Supreme Court has never directly considered the constitutional-
ity of warrantless arrests for misdemeanor DV crimes. In the dissenting opin-
ion in Welsh v. Wisconsin (1984), Justices White and Rehnquist stated, “we 
have never held that a warrant is constitutionally required to arrest for non-
felony offenses occurring out of the officer’s presence.” Some scholars sug-
gest that there exists a presumption of constitutionality evidenced by the 
enactment of warrantless arrest statutes in every state and by the provision of 
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the federal Violence Against Women Act of 1994 that required states and 
local governments to adopt mandatory or proarrest policies to receive fund-
ing under the Act (Cunningham, 1997).
DV warrantless arrest laws have been the subject of research and are often 
classified in the research by the amount of discretion an officer has to make on 
an arrest. Statutes that allow the officer to decide whether to arrest (often using 
the phrase “may arrest”) are termed discretionary; those that allow the offi-
cer to decide whether to arrest, but also convey a state preference for arrest, 
are termed preferred; and statutes that seem to require officers to arrest (often 
stating that officers “shall arrest”) are termed mandatory. Researchers have 
examined the effects of mandatory and preferred arrest laws on outcomes such 
as dual arrest, where both parties to the event are arrested (Hirschel, Buzawa, 
Pattavina, Faggiani, & Reuland, 2007), and intimate partner homicide (Iyengar, 
2009). However, researchers often do not agree on the classification of indi-
vidual arrest laws as discretionary, preferred, or mandatory, leading to diffi-
culties in making meaningful conclusions about the impacts of the laws.
Discrepancies in the ways the laws are classified often cannot be explained 
by changes in state laws over time. Possible sources of variation among 
researchers include interpretive differences, differences in classification cri-
teria, confusion, and error. Interpretive differences may occur because of the 
complexity of the laws: researchers may interpret the text of the laws differ-
ently. Furthermore, researchers may create differing criteria for their classifi-
cation schemes. For example, some laws contain both “may” and “shall arrest” 
provisions, which could lead one researcher to classify the law as discretion-
ary and another as mandatory. Other sources of difference include error or 
confusion: a research assistant may have erred in the compilation of statutes 
or interpreted the laws incorrectly. There is more than one example in the 
literature in which an arrest law is incorrectly identified as pertaining to war-
rantless arrest for commission of misdemeanor DV when it actually referred 
to arrest for violation of a DV protection order.
Our aim in this article is to enumerate and clarify key elements of state 
statutes that direct police officers on their power or duty to make a warrant-
less arrest when called to the scene of DV. Research on DV warrantless arrest 
laws rarely describe them as anything more than discretionary, preferred, or 
mandatory, either within their analyses or within the texts of their publica-
tions; researchers, and their audiences, may not be aware of the vast and 
potentially important differences among the laws. Advocates, policy makers, 
and researchers can use the information presented here to better understand 
existing research on these laws. Researchers can also develop more nuanced 
questions and hypotheses regarding DV warrantless arrest laws and their 
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effects and use the data presented here in investigations of these laws, includ-
ing policy implementation analyses, possibly hastening the proliferation of 
research in this area.
In this article, we list the DV warrantless arrest laws for each state, break-
ing them down into their common elements. We do not seek to classify these 
laws as mandatory, preferred, or discretionary. Instead, we seek to present 
the language of each law with as little interpretation as is required to provide 
those interested in these laws the information needed to make their own inter-
pretations and classifications. In the Discussion section, we analyze elements 
of the laws, paying particular attention to how they may encourage or dis-
courage the arrest of alleged DV perpetrators.
Method
A master list was created of existing DV warrantless arrest law citation com-
pilations (American Bar Association Commission on Domestic Violence, 2007; 
Hirschel et al., 2007; Iyengar, 2006; Miller, 2004). The text of each statute, 
as it read in April 2010, was found on Lexis Nexis and examined to deter-
mine whether the law met our case definition described below. For some 
states, multiple statutes that fit the case definition were identified; both stat-
utes were included in the analysis unless one statute simply referred back to 
the other regarding arrest, in which case only the referenced statute was 
included.
DV warrantless arrest laws were defined as those laws that authorize a 
police officer to arrest an alleged perpetrator of DV without a warrant when on 
a DV call. The mention of the crime of DV was determined by (a) use of a 
phrase commonly understood to mean DV, such as family violence, (b) refer-
ence to the relationship of the victim to the perpetrator as being intimate, such 
as a household member or spouse, or (c) whether the statute referenced other 
statutes criminalizing DV. If a statute did not specifically mention DV, 
whether the statute broadly covered misdemeanors, as DV incidents are often 
characterized, was determined. It is important to note that we did not analyze 
the special circumstances of arrest for protection order violations or com-
plaints of DV victimization by both parties, nor did we analyze case law, opin-
ions, or notes attached to the statutes.
Two researchers carefully read each statute to identify elements common 
among them and analyzed the laws based on these common elements. A table 
was developed (Table 1), and the laws were reread multiple times by each 
researcher to both fill in and verify the accuracy of the information. We also 
examined the legislative history of each statute to determine when the 
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language pertaining to a police officer’s authority to arrest for DV was made 
into law. Therefore, the implementation dates presented in Table 1 refer only 
to the language that specifically gives police the authority to arrest and are 
not necessarily the implementation dates for other elements of the statutes. 
For statutes with multiple arrest provisions (for example, an officer “may 
arrest,” but “shall arrest” if the victim sustained an injury), the implementa-
tion dates refer to the stronger of the two provisions. Also, a state might have 
had a “may arrest” provision prior to codifying a “shall arrest” provision, 
however such law changes are not represented in this study.
Results
Each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia have legislation allowing 
officers to make a warrantless arrest at the scene of DV. The statutes take 
two approaches: DV is either included in a list of offenses for which the 
police have the authority to make a warrantless arrest or warrantless arrest is 
included as one of the actions police could or should take when responding to 
DV. Five common elements were identified in the laws, and these elements, 
along with law citations and implementation dates, are found in Table 1.
The fourth column of Table 1 represents the first of the five common ele-
ments: the phrase used to describe a police officer’s authority to arrest. The 
majority of statutes use the phrases “may arrest” or “shall arrest” to describe 
this authority. Based on the statutes included in this study, 21 states specify 
only that police officers “may arrest,” have the “authority to arrest,” or may 
lawfully arrest, without a warrant, an alleged perpetrator of DV. Four states 
have statutes that assert only that arrest is “appropriate” or “preferred.” 
Fourteen states and the District of Columbia have statutes that state only that 
officers “shall” or “must arrest” for DV.
In addition, eight state statutes with “may arrest” provisions also have 
“shall arrest” or “preferred arrest” provisions that apply when specified factors 
additional to DV are present, as discussed below. For example, Arizona law 
states that officers may arrest for DV however, if the DV involves an injury to 
the victim or use of a deadly or dangerous weapon, officers shall arrest. The 
Louisiana law is presented a bit differently, stating that officers “shall arrest” 
unless “there is no cause to believe there is impending danger,” in which case 
arrest is at the officer’s “discretion” (La. R.S. §46:2140).
The statutes of Illinois, Louisiana, and New Mexico (N.M. Stat. Ann. 
§40-13-7) list arrest as one of numerous “reasonable steps” an officer shall 
take to keep victims of DV safe from future harm. Implemented 8 years 
before N.M. Stat. Ann. §40-13-7, New Mexico has an additional statute included 
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in the analysis that pertains to arrests for DV that states that an officer “may 
arrest” for DV (N.M. Stat. Ann. §31-1-7).
Kansas and California are likewise notable for each having two entries in 
Table 1. K.S.A. §22.2401 does not specifically mention DV; however misde-
meanor DV is implicitly included under the broad category of misdemeanor 
crimes for which an officer may arrest. K.S.A. §22.2307 instructs police 
departments to create their own policies requiring that officers “shall arrest” 
for DV. Both laws are included in this analysis because in the first, the state 
broadly grants arrest authority to police, and the second strengthens the arrest 
Table 2. Summary of States With Common Elements Contained in DV 
Warrantless Arrest Statutes by Phrasing of Arrest Authority
Phrasing 
of arrest 
authority
No additional 
elements
Arrest 
requires 
additional 
factors
Qualifications 
to arrest 
authority
Time 
limits for 
warrantless 
arrest to 
occur
Reporting 
requirements 
for no or 
dual arrest
May AL, GA, HI,  
IN, MI, NMa, 
NC, TX, VT
DE, KSb, KY, 
MD, NE, 
NDc, OK, 
PA, WV
WY CAd, ID, 
MD, MN, 
NH, NDc, 
OK, WY
FL
May and 
preferred
AR AR  
Preferred CAe, NDf MT MA, TN
May and  
shall
AZ, IA, LA, 
MO, NJ,  
SC
AZ, LA, VA LA, MO, SC MO, SC, VA
Preferred  
and shall
OH OH
Shall CT, KSg, OR DC, RI, SD, 
WA, WI
AK, IL, NV, 
NMh, NY, 
UT
AK, CO, IL, 
ME, MS, 
NV, RI, 
SD, WA, 
WI
AK, IL, UT, 
WI
a. N.M. Stat. Ann. §31-1-7
b. K.S.A. §22.2401
c. N.D. Cent. Code §14-07.1-11
d. Cal. Pen. Code §836
e. Cal. Pen. Code §13701
f. N.D. Cent. Code §14-07.1-10
g. K.S.A. §22.2307
h. N.M. Stat. Ann. §40-13-7
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language pertaining to DV through local police policy. Similarly, California 
Penal Code §836 grants police officers the authority to arrest for DV, and 
California Pen. Code §13701 mandates that police departments create poli-
cies in which arrest for DV is “encouraged.”
Table 2 lists the states that have statutes containing the remaining four 
common elements, broken down by their phrasing of the police officer’s 
arrest authority.
Most states only require that an officer have probable cause to believe that 
DV occurred to have the authority to arrest, but twenty-three states require 
more than probable cause, as listed in the fifth column of Table 1. The most 
commonly required additional factor is a visible injury to the alleged victim, 
although some states have alternate requirements. For example, Maryland 
law requires both the presence of an injury and one of another three factors 
justifying immediate arrest, such as property damage or the risk of further 
injury; Iowa requires injury, intent to injure, or the use or display of a deadly 
weapon.
For states with multiple arrest provisions (e.g., both “may” and “shall 
arrest” provisions) and an additional requirement to probable cause, the addi-
tional factor triggers the stronger of the arrest provisions. For example, in 
Arkansas, a police officer “may arrest” for DV, but arrest is the preferred 
action if the alleged perpetrator committed an additional violation of the 
criminal code. Multiple states that only have “may arrest” language also 
require additional factors to trigger the arrest authority. By requiring the pres-
ence of factors additional to probable cause, these provisions may serve to 
place limits on when an officer “shall” or “may arrest.”
Column 6 of Table 1 lists whether each statute contains language quali-
fying an officer’s authority to arrest. These qualifications tend to be vague 
in wording and either provide circumstances under which arrest is not 
required or otherwise allow for police discretion as to whether to arrest. The 
use of qualifying language is most common in statutes with “shall arrest” 
provisions. For example, in New York, a police officer does not have to 
arrest for misdemeanor DV if the victim requests that an arrest not be made, 
and both Arizona and Louisiana laws allow the police officer to avoid arrest 
if the officer believes the victim of misdemeanor DV is not in danger of 
further injury. However, some states have more vague provisions that 
state that a police officer shall arrest “when appropriate” (N.M. Stat. Ann. 
§40-13-7) or unless “special circumstances dictate a course of action other 
than arrest” (Va. Code Ann. §19.2-81.3).
Twenty-two states include a time limit by which police must make an 
arrest to do so without a warrant. Time limits for arrest, represented in 
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column 7 of Table 1, are often a specified number of hours after the DV 
incident, with the window of opportunity closing anywhere from 4 h after 
the incident (AR and WA) to allowing warrantless arrest if a police report 
was made within 28 days of the incident (WI). In some statutes, the time 
limit is seemingly more subjective; for example, California law states that 
police officers may arrest if they do so “as soon as probable cause arises,” 
and South Carolina states that police may arrest if the person to be arrested 
“freshly committed” DV.
The final analyzed common element of the DV warrantless arrest statutes, 
listed in column 8 of Table 1, is whether there are additional reporting 
requirements for DV cases in which the officer either does not make an arrest 
or arrests both parties. States frequently require officers to make a DV report 
if they go on a DV call; however 11 states have a specific reporting require-
ment for officers who make no arrest or a dual arrest. Massachusetts and 
South Carolina require a report only in cases of dual arrest, and Wisconsin 
requires a report only in cases of no arrest.
Discussion
There is great diversity among the state statutes enabling the warrantless arrest 
of alleged perpetrators of DV. The statutes’ common elements, identified 
here, may encourage or discourage arrest, or increase the amount of discretion 
a police officer has in making the decision to arrest. Due to these potential 
effects on arrest, and further implications on DV recidivism, it is critical that 
researchers, advocates, and policymakers are aware of these variations when 
conducting or interpreting research or making policy recommendations.
As statutes providing more than one arrest authority (e.g., statutes with 
both “may” and “shall arrest” provisions) most frequently require the pres-
ence of factors additional to probable cause for DV to trigger the stronger of 
the arrest provisions, the enumeration of additional factors may decrease 
discretion for DV cases that the state considers to be in greater need of inter-
vention. Additional factors provisions do not appear to simply define when 
probable cause to arrest is present in a DV case. For example, the New 
Jersey statute states that an officer may arrest if “there is probable cause to 
believe that an act of domestic violence has been committed . . .” but shall 
arrest if there is “probable cause to believe domestic violence has occurred” 
and the victim has signs of injury or there is also probable cause to believe a 
weapon was involved in the incident (N.J. Stat. §2C:25-21). In other words, 
probable cause must be present to trigger arrest authority in general, but 
probable cause plus an additional factor triggers a removal of some amount 
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of the police officer’s discretion in the decision to arrest. In this way, it 
appears that additional factors are included in some arrest laws to ensure that 
DV cases that are more severe are more likely to result in arrest.
The use of qualifying language is mainly found in laws with “shall arrest” 
provisions. These phrases describe situations in which arrest is not compul-
sory and often require judgment from a police officer as to when those situa-
tions apply. For example, Nevada’s statute, which states that a police officer 
shall arrest “unless mitigating circumstances exist,” requires a determination 
of what circumstances may mitigate arrest and whether those circumstances 
are present. Such qualifications in the law may lead to confusion among 
police departments and officers as to when arrest is or is not required. Local 
jurisdictions and police officers may have their own interpretations of what 
constitutes a mitigating circumstance or may choose to disregard qualifying 
language and simply institute a policy requiring arrest if the law grants them 
discretion to do so. These qualifications may also make it difficult for victims 
of DV to predict whether calling the police will result in an arrest, which 
could influence their decisions to call.
Limits on the time police have to make warrantless arrests of suspected 
DV offenders may also play a role in whether an arrest occurs. Roughly, half 
of all DV offenders leave the scene before police arrive (Feder, 1996), com-
plicating the possibility of warrantless arrest within a short time span. Once 
outside of the prescribed time limit, police may not be motivated to pursue an 
arrest warrant, particularly if it requires additional cooperation from the vic-
tim. It is possible that in states with time limits on warrantless arrest, perpe-
trators are able to avoid arrest altogether by leaving the scene after a call to 
the police has been made. In 2009, in the belief that restrictive time limits on 
warrantless arrest may be a factor in revictimization, the Minnesota legisla-
ture expanded their statute’s time limit from 12 to 24 hours in an effort to 
prevent the perpetrator from “re-assaulting the victim” (Cook, 2009). Whether 
time limits on warrantless arrest increase the risk of future assaults on victims 
is a worthy research question.
Eleven states have reporting requirements for officers who either fail to 
arrest or arrest both parties on a DV call; most of these requirements are 
included in “preferred” or “shall arrest” laws. These reporting requirements 
can be interpreted as encouraging arrest by placing a burden on those officers 
who do not arrest and discouraging dual arrests by placing a burden on those 
officers who arrest both parties. Research suggests that states with what were 
termed “mandatory” arrest laws had increased rates of dual arrests (Hirschel 
et al., 2007). In the future, researchers may examine whether the dual arrest 
rate is reduced in states with dual arrest reporting requirements. Interestingly, 
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instead of requiring a report of why no arrest was made at the scene of DV, 
New Mexico Stat. Ann. §40-13-7 requires a written report indicating reasons 
why an arrest occurred. This places an additional burden on officers who 
arrest, possibly discouraging arrest.
The classification of these statutes as discretionary, preferred, or manda-
tory arrest laws relies heavily on interpretation. In general, the word “shall” 
indicates a mandatory action, however the qualifications added to many of 
these laws allow more discretion to the police officer than the word “shall” 
implies. Some of the statutes that use the phrase “shall arrest” do not seem to 
mandate arrest when the qualifications included in the provision are taken 
into account. Further complicating law categorization are statutes that have a 
combination of “may,” “preferred,” and “shall arrest” provisions that are 
contingent on specific circumstances surrounding the DV incident (e.g., whether 
a deadly weapon was involved). For example, Missouri has one such “may” 
and “shall” law, and a review of the literature finds this law classified as rec-
ommended (Iyengar, 2006), mandatory (Hirschel et al., 2007), and discretion-
ary (American Bar Association Commission on Domestic Violence, 2007).
The number and diversity of elements included in DV arrest laws lead to 
circumstances where laws that are actually quite different are treated as the 
same in the research. To the authors’ knowledge, there is no research that 
examines whether the differences among these laws discussed here impact 
outcomes such as arrest rates or perpetrator recidivism. Instead of simply 
categorizing arrest laws as mandatory, preferred, and discretionary, as has 
been the common practice, researchers may take the more nuanced approach 
of testing the effects of specific elements of the laws to more precisely deter-
mine the effects of DV arrest statutes on outcomes. Depending on study 
design, employing such an approach may require the researcher to pinpoint 
implementation dates for the common elements of each law, a large under-
taking to be sure. However, it may be that certain elements of the laws make 
them more or less effective in increasing victim safety by reducing perpetra-
tor recidivism.
Research evaluating the implementation of these laws would allow policy 
analysts and advocates to better understand the steps needed to improve their 
effectiveness. Researchers might also look at whether officers are more likely 
to make “discretionary” arrests for DV in jurisdictions whose laws include 
both “may” and “shall arrest” provisions. The types of local policies and pro-
cedures that jurisdictions implement regarding warrantless arrest in response 
to state law may also differ in important ways. Research examining local 
responses to state legislation and resulting DV outcomes is critical to form a 
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nuanced understanding of the impact of arrest laws and subsequently craft 
policy to reduce violence and injury.
One limitation of this research is that it only included DV arrest statutes 
that were found in previous DV arrest law compilations. We are satisfied that 
we located the relevant laws for each state; all but two of the laws included 
here (K.S.A. §22.2401 and 11 Del C. §1904) specifically refer to DV. 
However, it is possible that this research did not locate all laws that give 
police the authority to arrest for DV. Also, this research provides no consid-
eration or analysis of the opinions and notes attached to each statute, nor does 
it look to relevant case law that might offer interpretation of state statutes. 
Such an investigation is beyond the scope of this research and not something 
commonly undertaken in policy analysis.
It is important to note that DV arrest laws regularly undergo legislative 
changes. This can be encouraging to advocates and policymakers, as they 
seek to strengthen their states’ laws, and challenging for researchers, who 
must routinely track legislative changes. This research provides a snapshot 
of state warrantless arrest laws for DV perpetration as they stood in April 
2010. It provides researchers information needed to undertake policy or 
implementation analyses of these laws. By breaking the laws down into 
common elements, we illuminate their differences; it is these differences 
that often make categorization and comparisons difficult. Although we do 
not offer a simple classification system, we do suggest that researchers take 
the common elements identified here into account when conducting their 
analyses. By providing this information, we hope to spur additional research 
on these laws and push the field forward at a faster pace than otherwise 
might have been seen.
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